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FOREWORD
The subject of chemical weapons and their contemporary use is an understudied one—especially at the
strategic level of analysis. Within the last few decades,
the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and indeed the U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) itself, has produced relatively few works on these weapons, their battlefield
use, and what this may mean to Landpower projection.
Provided by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, a past Minerva Chair
at our institution, this monograph, which focuses on
the chemical weapons programs of the Assad regime
and the Islamic State (IS) and their subsequent use of
these weapons on the battlefield, can therefore be considered a very unique and timely contribution related
to this topical area.
The monograph contains an introduction into the
subject matter, provides an overview of the chemical
warfare capabilities of the Assad regime and the IS,
addresses their contemporary use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, and highlights the ensuing lessons learned. It then offers nine U.S. Army policy and
planning considerations for those instances when
the Landpower force may be engaging in operations
against actors armed with chemical weapons or subsequently operating in environments contaminated by
chemical weapons. It does so by providing interlinking inferences that span the tactical through the operational into the strategic levels of analysis related to a
subject fraught with missing and partial information
and ongoing disinformation campaigns by the perpetrators and their allies of said chemical weapons use.
This targeted work, devoid of theoretical musings,
can be considered an applied counter-chemical warfare
policy document. By seeking to bridge the immediate
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past—focused on Assad regime and IS chemical weapons activities—with a recognition of the future threat
potentials that exist—specifically that of the chemical weapons capabilities of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and Islamic Republic of Iran—the
U.S. Army policy and planning guidance proposed
will be of immense interest to U.S. Army and Department of Defense leaders as well as senior U.S. Government policymakers tasked with managing weapons of
mass destruction arms control, mitigation, and elimination activities.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Chemical weapons remain a component of the
21st-century battlefield even though the international
community has attempted to ban them from the arsenals of both state and nonstate actors. They have been
referred to as the poor man’s atomic bomb, as have biological weapons, another form of nonnuclear weapons
of mass destruction. While chemical weapons do not
have the destructive power of strategic—or even tactical—nuclear warheads, they are far easier to acquire
or produce and are able to generate a terror factor even
when their use is merely threatened.
Chemical weapons also possess inherent military functions in that they can be used to kill and
degrade opposing troop formations and for area- and
materiel-denial purposes (e.g., persistent agents),
have anti-materiel uses (e.g., corrosive agents), and
can even cause aircrews to be grounded due to the
effects of myopia (e.g., nerve agents). The ongoing
threat of chemical agent attacks can also have psychological effects on military units and potentially force
military personnel to operate in mission-oriented protective posture gear and/or buttoned up in armored
fighting vehicles (relying upon their filtration units)
for extended periods of time, inhibiting battlefield
performance.
Concerns related to the chemical targeting of U.S.
military forces are not without recent incident precedent. On September 21, 2016, a shell containing sulfur
mustard landed in the Qayara West Air Base in Northern Iraq, which housed hundreds of U.S. troops, with
no injuries reported. Then, on April 16, 2017, U.S.
advisors in an Iraqi outpost in Western Mosul, Iraq,
were subjected to an Islamic State (IS) sulfur mustard
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munitions attack in which 25 Iraqi soldiers required
medical attention. Thus, the known North Korean and
suspected Iranian arsenals, as well as Hezbollah weapons transfer and use potentials, a Syrian wildcard use
scenario, and recent IS incidents directed at U.S. military forces, together suggest that chemical weapons
represent a very real battlefield threat. As a result, the
U.S. Army must—at a minimum—be prepared to operate in environments contaminated by chemical weapons, as well as be involved in related activities such as
mitigating their effects on friendly forces and civilian
populations, deterring their initial use, and facilitating the elimination of agent stockpiles and production
capabilities in coordination with the Joint Force and
the National Command Authority.
To address these concerns related to U.S. Army
operations, this monograph focuses on two case studies related to contemporary chemical weapons use in
Syria and Iraq by the Assad regime and the IS. The
document provides an overview of the chemical warfare capabilities of these two entities; discusses selected
incidents of chemical weapons use each has perpetrated; provides analysis and lessons learned concerning these chemical weapons incidents, their programs,
and the capabilities of the Assad regime and the IS;
and presents U.S. Army policy and planning considerations on this topical area of focus.
The two case studies provide quite a few valuable
insights for U.S. Army operational planning as well as
higher-level ancillary strategic considerations. Lessons
learned concerning the Assad regime’s program and
use of chemical agents in Syria are:
• The Assad regime has and will continue to view
chemical weapons as a strategic resource.
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• Assad regime survival is more important than
its chemical weapons program or engaging in
chemical warfare.
• To protect the Assad regime’s chemical weapons
program and ability to use chemical weapons,
deception and outright lies have been actively
utilized by the regime on an ongoing basis.
• The Assad regime continues to engage in brinkmanship when utilizing chemical warfare
attacks on its enemies within Syria.
• Some chemical weapons are more favored than
others for battlefield use by the Assad regime.
Lessons learned concerning the IS’s program and
their use of chemical agents in Iraq and Syria are:
• The IS approached chemical weapons use with
an operationally and tactically focused thought
process.
• The IS weaponized chemical agents as it could
and utilized them as soon as feasible.
• The chemical weapons sophistication achieved
by the IS never matured past a moderate level
of chemistry with a weaker form of sulfur mustard being the deadliest agent produced.
• The development of the IS’s chemical weapons
program was hindered by ongoing U.S. and
coalition subject matter expert and facilities targeting operations.
• The IS’s chemical weapons program never
developed to the point that it supported combined arms operations or was integrated with
the IS’s unmanned aerial systems or armored
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
(VBIED) programs.
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The U.S. Army counter-chemical warfare policy
and planning guidance proposed in this monograph,
decoupled from the present Department of Defense
countering weapons of mass destruction approach, is:
• Support joint and interagency intelligence collection and analysis of the state or nonstate
chemical warfare program of concern.
• Recognize the context within which the state or
nonstate chemical warfare program exists.
• Support the Joint Force in implementing
National Command Authority guidance concerning preconflict removal and elimination of
the state or nonstate chemical warfare program.
• Prepare to support the Joint Force to implement National Command Authority guidance
related to deterrence and chemical warfare use
response protocols.
• Support the Joint Force to implement National
Command Authority guidance concerning preemptive strike options against the state or nonstate chemical warfare program.
• Train, equip, and organize the force for operations in the projected environment contaminated by chemical weapons that may emerge.
• Extend chemical warfare defense planning to
rear area basing, coalition force, and civilian
populations in the areas of responsibility of the
Army Landpower force.
• Prepare for the trans-conflict targeting of the
state or nonstate chemical warfare program.
• Develop a strategic counternarrative plan
against the expected propaganda campaign that
will be utilized by the state or nonstate entity
possessing the chemical warfare program.
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Additional considerations in support of the above
focus on a number of elements. First, red teaming
and wargaming should be utilized in support of the
guidance discussed above. Such analytic techniques
offer a cost-effective and proven method of validating
potential counter-chemical warfare policies. Second,
leadership development in counter-chemical weapons expertise beyond the operational level should be
fostered. Chemical weapons have strategic impact
potentials—especially when ballistic missiles with
nerve agent payloads are pointed at U.S. allies. Finally,
research and writing pertaining to Army chemical
weapons defense policy should be encouraged at the
War College level. This area is very much an understudied field at the strategic Landpower studies level,
with little to no work being carried out on it. Given the
very real 21st-century threat potentials chemical weapons use represents, more professional consideration by
Army strategic leaders will be required.
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CONTEMPORARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE
IN SYRIA AND IRAQ BY THE ASSAD REGIME
AND THE ISLAMIC STATE
Chemical weapons remain a component of the
21st-century battlefield even though the international
community has attempted to ban their utilization, if
not outright existence, in the arsenals of both state and
nonstate actors alike. They have been referred to in the
past as the poor man’s atomic bomb, as have biological weapons which are representative of another form
of nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1
While chemical weapons do not have the destructive
power equivalence of strategic—or, for that matter,
even tactical—nuclear warheads, they are far easier to
acquire or produce and are able to generate a terror
factor even when just their use is threatened. This
later characteristic was evident during the January
1991 Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa,
Israel, which were initially thought to be carrying
nerve agent payloads. Quite literally, “the airwaves
deteriorated into near pandemonium” as reporters
were forced nervously to don gas masks while the
ambiguity of the missile strikes being or not being
only conventional in nature played on the fears of the
news crews.2
Chemical weapons also possess inherent military
functions in that they can be used to kill and degrade
opposing troop formations, be used for area- and
materiel-denial purposes (in the case of persistent
agents), have anti-materiel uses (in the case of corrosive agents), and can even cause aircrews to be
grounded due to the effects of myopia (in the case of
nerve agents). The ongoing threat of chemical agent
attacks can also have psychological effects on military units and, under certain conditions, force military
1

personnel to operate in mission-oriented protective
posture gear and/or buttoned up in armored fighting vehicles (relying upon their filtration units) for
extended periods of time, which inhibits their battlefield performance.
While chemical weapons have existed for well over
2,000 years (their use was chronicled by the ancient
Greeks during the Peloponnesian War in which sulfur
smoke was utilized as a choking agent for incapacitation purposes), such weapons have seen their greatest
battlefield employment during periods of the early
and later 20th century. During the first period—from
1915 to 1918, during World War I—the allies and
central powers used chlorine, and later, phosgene
and sulfur mustard agents. Some 90,000 fatalities
and roughly 1 million casualties occurred during the
conflict as a result of the use of chemical weapons.3
During the second period—from 1983 to 1988, during
the Iran-Iraq War—sulfur mustard, tabun, and possibly sarin were fielded by Iraqi forces, with Iranian
forces at the end of the war retaliating with phosgene,
cyanogen chloride, and sulfur mustard (likely) used.4
A 1991 declassified Central Intelligence Agency report
estimated that over 50,000 Iranian chemical warfare
casualties took place.5 Since the 1990s, chemical weapons have been employed on the battlefield or in terrorist incidents in Japan, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.6
Derived from this weapons use pedigree, concerns
over both small- and large-scale chemical weapons
use against deployed, forward garrisoned, and rear
area U.S. Army forces overseas naturally exist.7 These
concerns, especially as they relate to larger scale use,
are primarily reserved for the chemical warfare capabilities of North Korea and Iran.
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North Korea has extensive chemical artillery capabilities as a complement to its nuclear deterrent. Since
its 1961 “Declaration of Chemicalization,” it has gone
on to produce hundreds of tons of sulfur mustard as
well as thousands of tons of sarin and VX. One recent
estimate is that the massed North Korean artillery
could now blanket enough sarin in the Seoul, South
Korea, region to achieve a rate of agent dispersal of
“about 100 kilograms per square kilometer every 15
minutes.” By this delivery method, about 240 tons
of sarin could be distributed throughout Seoul in
a number of hours, resulting in approximately a 25percent causality rate.8
Iran developed an active chemical weapons program in 1983 during its war with Iraq. Blister, blood,
choking, and likely nerve agents have been produced
by this program that at its height had a yearly production capacity of 1,000 tons. While Iran ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, the
present state of its chemical agent stockpiles and delivery systems is unclear, although the expectation is that
it still has secret caches of chemical weapons under
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps control. Further,
given Iran’s robust chemical production capacity, it is
projected that chemical weapons could be readily produced from preexisting and newly created precursor
agents if hostilities were to break out with the United
States.9
Consternation also exists that, if a military conflict
began between Iran and the United States, Iran would
likely provide chemical agents to Hezbollah that
would fight as its proxy. Hezbollah currently retains
an arsenal of possibly over 100,000 missiles in Southern Lebanon, with long-range systems able to carry
chemical warheads that could be launched against
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U.S. and allied forces in the region.10 The Assad regime
in Syria and the Islamic State (IS) have also had, until
recently, very active chemical weapons programs and
have been engaged in the ongoing battlefield use of
these agents, although in the case of the Syrian Arab
Republic, no present expectation of its directly attacking U.S. forces with such munitions exists.11
Overall, concerns related to the chemical targeting
of U.S. military forces are not without recent incident
precedent. On September 21, 2016, a shell containing sulfur mustard landed in the Qayara West air
base in Northern Iraq that housed hundreds of U.S.
troops, with no injuries reported from the incident.12
Then, on April 16, 2017, U.S. advisors in an Iraqi outpost in western Mosul, Iraq, were subjected to an IS
sulfur mustard munitions attack in which 25 Iraqi soldiers required medical attention.13 Thus, the known
North Korean and suspected Iranian arsenals, as well
as Hezbollah weapons transfer and use potentials, a
Syrian wildcard use scenario, and recent IS incidents
of use directed at U.S. military forces, together suggest that chemical weapons represent a very real battlefield threat. As a result, the U.S. Army must—at a
minimum—be prepared to operate in environments
contaminated by chemical weapons. In addition, the
Army must be involved in related activities such as
mitigating the effects of chemical weapons on friendly
forces and civilian populations, deterring their use in
the first place, and ultimately facilitating the elimination of chemical agent stockpiles and production capabilities in coordination with the Joint Force and the
National Command Authority.
To address the abovementioned concerns related
to U.S. Army operations in environments contaminated by chemical weapons and ancillary mitigation,
deterrence, and elimination (e.g., arms control) issues,
4

this monograph will focus on two case studies related
to contemporary chemical weapons use in Syria and
Iraq by the Assad regime and the IS. Initially, this
monograph provides an overview of the chemical
warfare capabilities of these two entities. Then it discusses selected incidents of chemical weapons use
each has perpetrated. Next, it provides analysis and
lessons learned concerning these chemical weapons
incidents, their programs, and the capabilities of the
Assad regime and the IS. Lastly, it presents U.S. Army
policy and planning considerations on this topical
area of focus.
CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES OF THE
ASSAD REGIME AND THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS)
This section provides an overview of Assad regime
and IS chemical warfare capabilities. Such capabilities,
at a bare minimum, are derived from the utilization
of “weaponized agents” on the battlefield.14 Such weaponization occurs from a process of taking chemical
agents and merging them with delivery systems. In
order for a state (e.g., the Assad regime) or nonstate
group (e.g., the IS) to do this, the acquisition and/or
production of both agents and their delivery systems
is required. Some components of this activity can be
either domestic or foreign in nature but are typically
blended, at least initially in the case of states who
are creating the infrastructure to produce chemical
weapons.
Chemical agents can be acquired from domestic
sources, as in the case of the IS raiding a Syrian Government chemical weapons depot, or from foreign
sources, as in the case of Syria receiving them from
an allied state such as Russia. Such acquired agents
may already be in weaponized form and loaded in a
delivery system; however, this is very rare in the case
5

of nonbinary munitions due to transportation safety
issues and are highly uncommon even for such binary
munitions themselves. If the intent is to create a chemical agent production capability, domestic research and
production facilities need to be created, and a scientific
workforce would need to be educated. Since chemical
agents require precursor agents in their manufacture,
these precursors also need to either be manufactured
domestically, requiring their own production facilities
and educated personnel, or purchased overseas. Once
chemical warfare agents have been produced, they
then need to be safely stockpiled and protected.
From a chemical agent acquisition and production standpoint, this is only half the endeavor since
delivery systems also need to be acquired or produced in order to eventually merge a chemical agent
and a delivery system for weaponization purposes.
Such chemical weapons produced will typically be colocated with or near bulk chemical agent stockpiles for
safety and security purposes. Once a bare minimum
chemical warfare capability exists, some sort of basic
doctrine needs to be developed in order to utilize
it, along with the creation of defensive protocols for
decontamination and medical response in case of accidents and other mishaps related to the weaponized
chemical agents. Chemical warfare personnel will also
need to be assigned to specialized units and equipped
and trained in offensive and defensive doctrine to gain
proficiency; although, in the case of the IS, chemical
warfare doctrine, equipment, and training may be
exceedingly minimal.15
THE ASSAD REGIME
Given the sensitive nature of this subject matter
related to the Syrian Arab Republic—it exists within a
6

highly classified state program—its chemical warfare
capabilities are opaque at best. The Assad regime, then
under the rule of Hafez al-Assad, initially acquired
chemical weapons, most certainly sulfur mustard (a
blister agent) and possibly sarin (a nerve agent), as
early as 1972 from Egypt prior to the start of the Yom
Kippur War. Russia, during the same period, provided defensive equipment for Syrian military personnel that would be fielding these chemical weapons.16
As a result of the Yom Kippur defeat, the subsequent
defeat in June 1982 in Lebanon by Israel, and ongoing
regional security concerns with Iraq, the Assad regime
continued to develop its chemical warfare program
primarily with Russian support.
Sporadic, limited glimpses of, and at times contradictory information related to the Syrian chemical
weapons program have since been reported on for
more than 4 decades. An overview of this information can be found in the Syrian Chemical Chronology spanning December 1968 through March 2008.17
When more authoritative program information was
provided (such as a declassified Top Secret Central
Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment published
in November 1985 on this subject and released in
November 2011), it was so heavily redacted as to be of
marginal use only, although it did confirm that Syrian
chemical warfare units were fully configured around
Soviet military doctrine.18
More substantive chemical weapons program clarity related to the Assad regime has only emerged over
the last 5 years. This is a direct result of the infamous
August 21, 2013, Ghouta, Syria, chemical attack. Due
to subsequent international fallout with the Western
liberal democracies, the Assad regime was forced to
accept a deal brokered by Russia, a long-term ally and

7

regime patron. Failure to do so would have meant a
certain widening of the Syrian conflict with Western
coalition countries (spearheaded by the United States
and France) engaging in direct air strikes. As a result
of multiparty negotiations, United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2118 was adopted on September 27, 2013, that set the terms of the agreement with
the Syrian Arab Republic and guaranteed that coalition air strikes would be averted.19 As a result of that
deal, Syria both hastily acceded to the 1992 CWC on
October 14, 2013, and accepted the fast track destruction of its chemical weapons program, or at least those
components of the program that it openly declared.20
A confidential chemical weapons program declaration provided by the Assad regime to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of the
UN subsequently took place on October 24, 2013.21 A
listing of the chemical agents (and precursor agents),
chemical sites, and chemical weapons (i.e., delivery
systems) were declared and then cataloged by the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
personnel to facilitate their destruction either on site,
as in the case of production equipment and unfilled
munitions, or for overseas transport, in the case of
agents; this list can be viewed in table 1. It was created by Al Mauroni, a Department of Defense (DoD)
counter-WMD expert, who assembled it from various
sources including the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons documents. This table provides
some transparency related to the confidential declaration, none of which has been made public. It also incorporates the October 2014 Assad regime disclosure to
the UN Security Council concerning the existence of
three additional chemical weapons research facilities
one additional chemical weapons production facility
somehow not disclosed the previous year.22
8

CHEMICAL
AGENTS

580 metric tons of methylphosphonyl difloride
(DF, a precursor for sarin)
20 metric tons of mustard agent
130 metric tons of isopropyl alcohol
310 metric tons of 4 “other category 1 industrial
chemicals”
260 metric tons of 13 different “category 2 industrial chemicals” including chloroethylamine,
phosphorus, trichloride, phosphorus oxychloride, hexamine, hydrogen chloride, and hydrogen fluoride

CHEMICAL
SITES

1 research and development, 10 production (including 27 production facilities), and 12 storage sites

CHEMICAL
WEAPONS

1,230 unfilled munitions (aerial bombs, missile
warheads)

Table 1. Assad Regime Chemical Weapons
Program—Declared23
The information provided in table 1 can be compared to intelligence estimates of Assad regime chemical warfare capabilities compiled in table 2. This
table principally relies on a declassified and translated French intelligence assessment published on
September 3, 2013, with the addition of a few other
chemical weaponry estimates. This assessment estimated that over 1,000 metric tons of chemical agents
and precursor chemicals exist in the Syrian program.
It is impossible to reconcile the table 1 Assad regime
declaration and Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons audits with the table 2 intelligence
estimates due to their different emphases, finite data
provided, and limited reliability of the information
even when provided. Further, the listing of 130 metric
tons of isopropyl alcohol attributed to the Assad
regime declaration in table 1, while a required reactant
to DF (methylphosphonyl difloride, 580 metric tons
listed) in the production of sarin, is problematic. This
9

common chemical utilized in industrial and other processes thus represents 10 percent of the Syrian chemical agents and precursors with it being given equal
weight to CWC schedule 1 and 2 chemicals.24 Many
other issues with the chemical weapons program figures, such as the low amount of sulfur mustard tonnage and low number of munitions declared, also
exist.25
AGENT

TYPE;
PERSISTENCY

STOCKPILE;
METRIC TONS

DELIVERY METHOD

Sulfur
Mustard
(H/HD)

Blister Agent;
Very High

>200 Tons

Nitrogen
Mustard
(HN)

Blister Agent;
High

Unknown; Experimental Development Potentials

Assume same as Sulfur
Mustard

Sarin (GB)

Nerve Agent;
Low

>200 Tons (Bulk
of the Arsenal)

Scud D (600 km)
Scud C (500 km)
Scud B (300 km)
M600 (<300 km)
SS21 (70 km)
Artillery Rockets (<50 km)
Tactical Munitions (<50 km)
250kg & 500kg Bomb (via
aircraft)

Soman (GD)

Nerve Agent;
Moderate

Unknown; Experimental Development Potentials

Assume same as Sarin (GB)

VX

Nerve Agent;
Very High

>20 Tons

Scud D (600 km)
Scud C (500 km)
Scud B (300 km)
M600 (<300 km)
SS21 (70 km)
Artillery Rockets (<50 km);
BM-14, Volcano

Chlorine
(Cl); Pure &
Mixed

Choking Agent;
Low

Industrial Production Capability

Barrel Bomb, Gas Cylinder
(via helicopter)

Scud C (500 km)
M600 (<300 km)
SS21 (70 km)
Artillery Rockets (<50 km)

Italics = Unconfirmed and speculative agents and/or stockpiles.

Table 2. Assad Regime Chemical Warfare
Capabilities—Estimated26
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Suffice it to say, the Syrian Arab Republic had,
until acceding to the CWC and allowing for its
declared chemical weapons program components to
be destroyed and whose removal out of the country
for subsequent elimination took place between October 6, 2013, and June 23, 2014,27 well developed capabilities to deliver sulfur mustard, sarin, and VX agents
in weaponized munitions against both external and
internal enemies. It is unknown what percentage of
the existing chemical weapons program and munitions the Assad regime allowed to be sacrificed in
order to stave off Western airstrikes in the fall of 2013.
What is known is, post-Ghouta, is the regime initially
kept a low profile in its chemical weapons use and followed a dual track of reconstituting some of the lost
components of its chemical weapons production capabilities. These measures likely included the rebuilding of a fleet of mobile sarin production labs in the
back of large nondescript trucks28 and the acceptance
of shipments of North Korean delivery systems,29 as
well as exploiting dual-purpose chemicals (e.g., chlorine) as low-tech chemical weapons in a new round
of attacks against the enemies of the regime.30 This
reconstitution was carried out by the Syrian Scientific
Studies and Research Center (the producer of chemical agents for the Assad regime) in coordination with
the little known Syrian air force organization termed
Unit 450 that controls the regime’s chemical weapons
stockpiles.31 Some speculation also exists concerning
the fate of 2,000 chemical agent aerial-type bombs that
existed in the regime arsenal prior to it acceding to the
CWC. While the regime said it converted them over to
conventional weapons use, some, if not the majority,
of these nerve agent dispersal munitions could have
been secretly retained.32 As time passed, the Assad
regime then took a calculated risk and attempted
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to revert openly to the use of the more deadly nerve
agent sarin once again in the April 4, 2017, Khan
Sheikhoun attack.33 This blatant CWC violation immediately resulted in a military response by the United
States in which 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles targeted
Al Shayrat Airfield from which the Syrian aircraft
engaging in the chemical attack originated.34
THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS)
The IS chemical weapons program completely
pales in comparison to the Assad regime program in
duration, size, and expertise. Information on this relatively nascent and small-scale program, which followed both chemical agent acquisition and production
strategies, is, however, extremely difficult to obtain.
As a result, only glimpses of this program appear in
newspaper publications and online media reports
from time to time.
As background, the IS predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq
(also known by other names over time) was, sometime prior to 2003, linked via its leader Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi to the Khurmal facility in northern Iraq.
This facility was operated by Ansar al-Islam and was
involved in cyanide experimentation and weaponization attempts. Further, in January 2004, a small block
of cyanide salt was discovered in a safe house in Baghdad, a laboratory in Fallujah in November 2004 was
seized, and a chemical facility was discovered in Mosul
in August 2005; together, they were either directly or
indirectly linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Additionally, in
April 2004, a chemical bomb plot undertaken under
the direction of al-Zarqawi targeting major intelligence and political facilities in Amman, Jordan, was
interdicted. Some 20 tons of chemical agents (mostly
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pesticides, potassium cyanide, and what appeared to
be crude TATP [triacetone triperoxide] bombmaking
precursors) were to be utilized in the creation of chemically boosted vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs).35 After the death of al-Zarqawi in
June 2006, during the latter 2006 to mid-2007 period,
the IS predecessor then began to use chlorine VBIEDs
in a number of attacks in the Ramadi area of Iraq.
These attacks were facilitated by the development of
a small chlorine weapons program. They only ceased
after local access to chlorine was blocked, al-Qaeda in
Iraq leadership targeted, and the program itself dismantled by Iraqi and U.S. forces.36
The IS program focused on in this monograph
appears to have been built from scratch beginning in
the summer of 2014 on the heels of the failure of an
earlier al-Qaeda in Iraq chemical weapons plot foiled
in Baghdad in June 2013.37 The new program was
facilitated by Abu Malik, also known as Salih Jasim
Muhammed Falah al-Sabawi. Abu Malik had been
affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq since 2005, remained
with the group as it evolved, and would go on to initially provide direction to the IS concerning the creation of its chemicals program. Years ago, he had been
an engineer at the Al Muthanna State Establishment.38
Al Muthanna (formerly known as Project 922) housed
a massive facility that was the center of the Saddam
Hussein regime’s old chemical weapons program.
The facility existed about 140 kilometers northwest
of Baghdad in the Saladin Governorate. Under Abu
Malik’s guidance, IS chemical agent acquisition began
in full force with the seizure of the defunct and largely
destroyed facility in June 2014. The group had an
opportunity over approximately 5 months to loot its
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contents until Al Muthanna was retaken by the Iraqi
Army in late November 2014:
Many chemical weapons incidents clustered around the
ruins of the Muthanna State Establishment, the center of
Iraqi chemical agent production in the 1980s.
Since June, the compound has been held by the IS, the
world’s most radical and violent jihadist group. In a
letter sent to the United Nations this summer, the Iraqi
government said that about 2,500 corroded chemical
rockets remained on the grounds, and that Iraqi officials
had witnessed intruders looting equipment before
militants shut down the surveillance cameras.
The United States government says the abandoned
weapons no longer pose a threat. But nearly a decade
of wartime experience showed that old Iraqi chemical
munitions often remained dangerous when repurposed
for local attacks in makeshift bombs, as insurgents did
starting by 2004.39

After the Iraqi Army recovered the facility, one of
their government officials said that IS militants were
unable to penetrate the storage facility:
Islamic State [IS] militants, who had seized the area during
a lightning offensive last June, were not able to penetrate
the fortified bunkers, Mohammad Jawad Al-Doraky
told delegates at a chemical weapons conference in The
Hague.
He said Iraqi government forces had now managed to
oust [the] Islamic State [IS] from the compound, where
two sealed bunkers contain stockpiles of old chemicals,
rockets and equipment.40

This statement is incorrect, as some level of IS looting did take place; just as is the earlier U.S. statement
about the benign nature of the facilities’ chemical
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contents are in error. In fact, a Central Intelligence
Agency report on the facility written in 2004 as a
component of the Saddam regime’s chemical warfare program portrays the dangerous chemical agents
associated with it as well as mentioning some of the
past looting of equipment and munitions due to earlier facility breaches.41
The massive site appears to represent a vast and
deadly chemical agent and precursor smorgasbord
of rusted and leaking munitions, containers, and barrels of sulfur mustard, sarin, and other highly toxic
substances. The question is not whether the IS could
penetrate some of the sealed cruciform-shaped earth
covered storage bunkers within 5 months, but rather
once they did, under Malik’s leadership, what types
and amounts of chemical agents were still contained
within them, were they still viable, could IS personnel safely recover and transport them, and could those
agents then be repurposed and weaponized for future
utilization? Such important questions still remain
unanswered. Abu Malik was subsequently targeted
and killed in a U.S. drone strike specifically directed
against him in the vicinity of Mosul, Iraq, on January
24, 2015. According to a statement released by U.S.
Central Command, “His death is expected to temporarily degrade and disrupt the terrorist network and
diminish [the IS] ability to potentially produce chemical weapons against innocent people.”42
A small IS chemical weapons research cell was
then mentioned in September 2015 by an anonymous
U.S. official and quoted in news reports. It relates to
the utilization of powdered sulfur mustard in at least
four attacks on both sides of the Syria-Iraq border,
one in which 120 millimeter (mm) chemical-tipped
mortar shells were employed. The prevailing thought
was that this cell was producing the powdered agent
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and weaponizing it as part of ongoing field experiments as opposed to seized Iraqi or Syrian sulfur
mustard stockpiles being utilized.43 This was followed
by the reported capture of Sleiman Daoud al-Afari (a
former Saddam regime chemical weapons expert who
was working for the IS) in Badoosh (also known as
Badush), Iraq, in February 2016.44 He provided actionable intelligence: “Under interrogation by the U.S.
military, al-Afari has reportedly provided valuable
information regarding ISIS chemical weapons and
operations.”45 This subsequently resulted in airstrikes
against a production plant in Mosul and a deployed
chemical weapons “tactical unit” in the vicinity of that
city.46 In May 2016, Abu Sufyan, “a senior [IS] chemical
expert who staged chemical attacks in the Euphrates
River Valley,” was targeted and killed by U.S. forces.47
It was then reported in August 2016, via an interview with Abu Ahmad (also an IS operative), that the
group had much earlier acquired a large quantity of
sarin, sulfur mustard, and chlorine agents (the equivalent of up to 10 large cargo trucks worth of stocks)
from the base of Syrian Army Regiment 111 near
Darat Izza, Syria, in mid-August 2013. The almost
500-acre fortified base had originally been overrun in
December 2012 by the Al-Nusra Front (a component of
al-Qaeda), many of whose members, including those
who had seized the Assad regime’s chemical agents,
went over to the Syrian factions merging with the
Iraqi jihadists in the process of forming the IS. While
the report remains unsubstantiated, it raises the possibility of at least some Assad regime chemical warfare agents falling into the hands of the IS is not totally
implausible.48
On September 14, 2016, in Iraq “near Al Huwayjah, two strikes [conducted by U.S. coalition forces]
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engaged an ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant]
chemical weapons storage facility and destroyed a
rocket system, a rocket rail, and a mortar system.”49
This was followed by U.S. air strikes on September 23,
2016, on a converted pharmaceutical factory complex
in the Mosul area turned into an IS local headquarters
and chemical weapons production plant—the types
of warfare agents being produced were thought to be
either chlorine or sulfur mustard.50 Concerning the
quality of the chemical agents produced:
The ISIS-made mustard agent is typically in a crude form,
a powder mixed with oil in makeshift containers strapped
to conventional munitions. ISIS has shown no evidence of
producing mustard in its gas state, which would be a far
more lethal form.
The IS group makes the mustard agent in laboratories
inside its territory in Iraq and Syria and there’s no
evidence the group has imported it from other countries,
military officials said.51

An IS chemical-tipped missiles project as well as
chemical weapons production (specifically, sulfur
mustard) in Mosul University was then revealed in
January and February 2017, respectively, as the facilities were overrun by Iraqi and other coalition troops.52
With the increasing loss of key research and production sites, which include the Mosul facilities, and with
Raqqa increasingly under pressure, the IS attempted
by May 2017 to reconstitute a new chemical weapons cell in the Mayadin region of Syria.53 In response,
the United States designated two of the surviving IS
chemical weapons program leaders, Attallah Salman
‘Abd Kafi al-Jaburi and Marwan Ibrahim Hussayn
Tah al-Azawi, in June for immediate capture or elimination.54 The IS has since been unable to restart its
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chemical weapons production capabilities effectively
and has seen its program degraded to the point where
it might be able to create small batches of impure
sulfur mustard or chlorine agents. This production is
also becoming increasingly difficult for the group to
even undertake.55 Ongoing U.S. collation strikes (air
and artillery fires) on the dwindling components of
this program since June 2017 are as follows:
July 27: Near Rawah [Iraq], one strike destroyed an ISIS
chemical storage site.56
July 31: Near Dayr Az Zawr [Syria], three strikes
destroyed 13 ISIS oil stills, an oil storage barrel, and an
ISIS chemical weapons factory.57
August 28: Near Dayr Az Zawr, Syria, one strike engaged
an ISIS tactical unit and destroyed an IS in Iraq and Syria
chemical weapons cache.58
September 24: Near Huwijah, Iraq, three strikes engaged
three IS in Iraq and Syria tactical units and destroyed two
chemical factories.59

An estimate of IS chemical warfare capabilities
can be viewed in table 3. Chemical agents confirmed
to be in the possession of the IS are sulfur mustard,
chlorine, and some pesticides. No nerve agent weaponization or use on the battlefield by this organization
can be confirmed. Further, no confirmation of IS possession of nerve agents exists, with this being a speculative capability at best.
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AGENT

TYPE;
PERSISTENCY

STOCKPILE;
METRIC TONS

DELIVERY
METHOD

Sulfur Mustard (H/HD)

Blister Agent; Very
High

Low-quality production in converted facilities in
Iraq and Syria

Powered form—120
mm Mortars, Artillery
Shells, 122 mm Grad
Rockets (20 km), Improvised Rockets

Looting of al-Muthanna Facility, Iraq
(Unknown amounts
in corroded artillery
shells); Seized Regiment 111, Syria
Stockpile
Sarin (GB);
Unknown if
Cyclosarin (GF)
is included

Nerve Agent; Low

Looting of al-Muthanna Facility, Iraq
(Up to 15,000 liters
of GB may have
existed in corroded
rockets—approximately 16 metric
tons)

No Confirmed Battlefield Use—Not Repurposed or Weaponized

VX

Nerve Agent; Very
High

Looting of al-Muthanna Facility, Iraq
(Potentials); Seized
Regiment 111, Syria
Stockpile

No Confirmed Battlefield Use—Not Repurposed or Weaponized

Pesticides

Phosphine (PH3);
Other Undisclosed
Agents

Seized Stockpiles
and
Production
Facilities

IEDs, Shells

Precursor Agents;
Unknown

Looting of al-Muthanna
Facility,
Iraq
(Unknown
amounts)

Choking Agent;
Low

Seized and Improvised Industrial
Production Facilities in Syria and
Iraq

Hazardous Industrial Chemicals—Includes
Hydrogen
Cyanide (AC)
precursors; H/
HD, GB, GF,
GA (Tabun),
VX precursors
may also exist
Chlorine (Cl)

Roadside
Bombs,
Mortar Shells, Rockets, AVBIEDs

Seized
Regiment
111, Syria Stockpile
Italics = Unconfirmed and speculative agents and/or stockpiles

Table 3. IS Chemical Warfare
Capabilities—Estimated60
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CONTEMPORARY USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
A number of maps have been produced that provide visual overviews of alleged and actual chemical
weapons incidents taking place in Syria by the Assad
regime and in Iraq and Syria by the IS. A sampling
of these maps range from an ongoing crowd-sourced
wiki creation that integrates lists of individual wiki
incident entries for Syria,61 through an early International Institute for Counter-Terrorism report that
included an Assad regime incident specific map,62
and a later Jane’s map focused on allegations of IS use
incidents in Iraq and Syria.63 Quite a bit of incident
variability exists between these maps and some of the
others not mentioned. Thus, no collective data set of
the actual incidents taking place can be determined
within the parameters of this monograph. Rather, a
small number of illustrative incidents involving the
Assad regime and IS to convey chemical weapons use
patterns will be discussed.
The Assad Regime
The earliest allegation of Assad regime chemical
weapons use was reported on December 23, 2012. It
relates to a Homs, Syria, poison gas attack in which
at least six people in a rebel-held area were reported
to have been killed.64 While chlorine was initially suspected in the attack, 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) use
was also suspected and thought to be more probable,
although this has since been met with skepticism and
repudiated—with weaponized commercial pesticide
now suggested as being used.65 However, this pesticide and sarin may manifest similar victim symptomology. A month prior to the attack, an indications and
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warnings event took place in which Israel reportedly
shared satellite intelligence with the United States:
“Syrian troops appeared to be mixing chemicals at
two storage sites, probably the deadly nerve gas sarin,
and filling dozens of 500-pound bombs that could be
loaded on airplanes.”66 An international diplomatic
effort of diverse interests (composed of the United
States, Arab states, Russia, China, Iraq, and Turkey)
put political pressure on the Assad regime, ending the
preparation of the sarin-filled bombs. While an international crisis was thought to have been averted, especially given the Barack Obama administration’s earlier
Assad regime “red-line” chemical weapons use stance
on August 20, 2012, the Homs attack a month later and
follow-on ones would prove otherwise.67
Since that first use incident, at least half-a-dozen
incidents related to nerve agents and a dozen related
to the less deadly choking agent chlorine have taken
place. Chlorine agent use is likely well into the low
dozens of incidents, with eight incidents identified
as taking place between November 17 and December
13, 2016, and another eight identified as taking place
between January 8 and April 7, 2017.68 Even such conservative estimates do not go unchallenged. Ongoing
disinformation campaigns conducted by the Assad
regime and their Russian allies, as well as some of the
jihadi opposition groups, related to chemical warfare
incidents exist. This has helped to obscure who the
actual perpetrators are, with finger-pointing on both
sides and even at U.S.-backed forces taking place.69
Additionally, even U.S. determinations of Assad
regime chemical weapons use are also occasionally
in variance with UN fact-finding mission reports. The
reason is that UN teams, at times, will have to conduct
their investigations remotely because of the dangers
inherent in making entry into contested urban areas.
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Further, due to political considerations, the UN is
allowed to state that chemical weapons were utilized
in an incident, but they do not have the mandate to
name the perpetrator of the criminal act.70 Still, incidents of Assad regime chemical weapons use can be
identified and are provided in table 4 to highlight
some of the agents utilized, their patterns of deployment, and effect.
DATE
March 19,
2013

LOCATION

AGENT; DELIVERY
METHOD

TARGET; DEATHS and
CASUALTIES

Khan Al
Asal,
Aleppo,
Syria

Insecticide or nerve
agent (sarin probable);
overflying aircraft
dropping barrel
bomb; a rocket or
missile was also suggested

Assad regime soldiers
and civilians; 20 deaths
and 124 casualties

April 13, 2013

Sheik
Maqsood,
Aleppo,
Syria

Sarin; helicopter or
aircraft munitions
drop

Free Syrian Army (FSA);
1 death and 21 casualties

April 29, 2013

Saraqueb,
Syria

Sarin; helicopter dropping three improvised
munitions (trailing
white smoke)

Free Syrian Army (FSA)
area; 1 death and 10 casualties

Ghouta area
of Damascus,
Syria

Sarin; surface-to-surface rockets with
chemical payload
capability

Insurgent fighters and
civilians; 281 to 1,429
deaths and low 1,000s
casualties

April 11 and
18, 2014

Keferzita
(Kafr Zita),
Syria

Chlorine; helicopters dropping barrel
bombs

Civilians; 2 deaths and
200 casualties

December 9,
2016

Kallaseh,
Aleppo,
Syria

Chlorine; helicopter
dropping yellow gas
cylinder

+50 civilian casualties at
al-Hayat clinic

January 8-9,
2017

Basimah,
Damascus,
Syria

Chlorine; unknown
delivery system

46 causalities

April 4, 2017

Khan Sheikhoun, Syria

Sarin; warplane dropping KhAB-250 kg or
KhAB-500 kg bombs

92 deaths and +200 causalities

August 21,
2013

Table 4. Chemical Weapons Use in Syria by the
Assad Regime—Selected71
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Khan Al Asal, Aleppo, Syria (March 19, 2013)
This chemical weapons incident took place in the
Khan Al Asal area of Aleppo in the early morning
hours. It appears to have been a case of Assad regime
on Assad regime chemical fratricide. It resulted in
organophosphate poisoning—in all likelihood, sarin
gas—resulting in 20 deaths and 124 injuries to regime
soldiers and civilians. A barrel bomb type device, a
commonly used improvised explosive device (IED),
was dropped from a regime helicopter on its own controlled part of the city, although alternative reports
of a rocket or missile being utilized have also been
made. As part of an active propaganda campaign, the
Assad regime and the Russian Government claimed
that a rocket containing sarin had been fired by rebel
forces at the Assad regime position and called in a UN
team to investigate the incident. This was a rather bold
gambit, given that the Aleppo rebels did have the technical capacity to either produce or utilize binary-type
sarin munitions.72
Sheik Maqsood, Aleppo, Syria (April 13, 2013)
In the Sheik Maqsood neighborhood of Aleppo, a
Free Syrian Army fighter was killed and 23 injured by
an Assad regime sarin gas attack. A bomb of some sort
was dropped by either a helicopter or an aircraft on
the rebel position. Atropine was utilized to treat those
injured.73
Saraqueb, Syria (April 29, 2013)
Free Syrian Army controlled territory was attacked
in Saraqueb by an Assad regime helicopter that
dropped multiple bombs containing sarin on its forces
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and on civilians. A trail of white smoke was seen, associated with the dropping of the three munitions. One
civilian death and 10 injuries subsequently took place.
Atropine was provided to those injured to relieve
miosis and other nerve agent symptoms. A newer
investigative report provides images of the sarin canisters dropped in this incident and brings together discrete pieces of information related to it.74
Ghouta, Damascus, Syria (August 21, 2013)
This incident represents the largest Assad regime
chemical weapons attack that took place during the
Syrian civil war. The earlier incidents were in some
ways precursors leading up to it, as the regime became
emboldened for not being more forcefully sanctioned
for its chemical warfare activities. In this attack, the
Assad regime released a barrage of surface-to-surface
rockets containing sarin into the rebel-held areas of
East and West Ghouta, Damascus. The estimated death
toll for this incident ranges from no less than 281, provided by French intelligence, to 1,429, based on a U.S.
Government figure. Causality estimates are projected
to be in the low thousands.75 Of note is the White
House assessment that “the Syrian regime has used
chemical weapons over the last year primarily to gain
the upper hand or break a stalemate in areas where it
has struggled to seize and hold strategically valuable
territory.”76 Given the criticality of the Ghouta district
to the future integrity of Damascus (its capital city), it
is of little wonder that this was the focal point of the
Assad regime’s large chemical weapons attack. After
the attack, the Assad regime and their Russian allies
(and even the Iranians) attempted, to no avail, to place
the blame for it on rebel groups. This disinformation
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narrative is consistent with the ongoing Assad regime
propaganda campaign.77
Keferzita (Kafr Zita), Syria (April 11 and 18, 2014)
This post-Ghouta incident begins the Assad
regime’s use of chlorine against opposing rebel fighters and civilians. In two attacks that killed 2 and
injured 200 in Keferzita, barrel bombs containing chlorine were dropped by regime helicopters, primarily
against civilians. The chemical agents utilized in the
attacks originated from overseas:
The canisters contain markings with the code ‘CL2’ [the
symbol for chlorine gas] and ‘NORINCO‘ [indicating that
the cylinders were manufactured in China by the stateowned company NORINCO]. Yellow is the standard
industrial gas color code for chlorine.78

Kallaseh, Aleppo, Syria (December 9, 2016)
An Assad regime helicopter dropped a yellow gas
cylinder near the al-Hayat clinic in the Kallaseh area
of Aleppo in this evening incident. Over 50 causalities
resulted from the attack. Numerous chlorine attacks
had been taking place since April 2014 by the Assad
regime in an attempt to sidestep the CWC to which it
had acceded.79
Basimah, Damascus, Syria (January 8-9, 2017)
This chlorine use incident was conducted over 2
days in three separate attacks by the Assad regime.
It took place in the Basimah section of Damascus and
resulted in 46 casualties. The type of delivery method
was not specified; however, for regime chlorine-based
agents, typically barrel bombs and gas cylinders are
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utilized for dispersal. The incident is representative of
a large number of other such regime chlorine attacks
that have occurred in that many individuals were
injured, but few, if any, immediate deaths took place.80
Khan Sheikhoun, Syria (April 4, 2017)
The Khan Sheikhoun incident represents the
second largest chemical weapons attack carried out
by the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.
It was an attempt once again to push the envelope
against the Western coalition with respect to conducting large-scale nerve agent attacks rather than utilizing less effective chlorine munitions, as it had been
doing post-Ghouta. In this incident, a Syrian aircraft
dropped either KhAB 250 kilogram (kg) or 500 kg
bombs containing sarin on rebel-held territory. The
early morning attack caused 92 fatalities and over 200
causalities and, as was mentioned earlier, was met
with a large-scale U.S. cruise missile attack against the
Assad regime base where the attacking Sukhoi SU-22
aircraft originated. Once again, Russia attempted to
deflect blame from the Assad regime by stating that
the nerve agent release was due to Syrian aircraft hitting a rebel chemical weapons stockpile.81
The Islamic State (IS)
After a roughly 7-year hiatus from the al-Qaeda in
Iraq use of chlorine-based VBIEDs in mid-2007, a successful IS chlorine attack was launched in July 2014:
IS is believed to have first used CW in July 2014, during a
battle to capture the village of Avdiko, in north east Syria.
Very few details are available, but three Kurdish YPG
fighters were reported to have been killed by the CW.
This attack was part of a broader assault on the village,
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and whilst it contributed to the IS victory, it was unlikely
to have been a decisive factor in the battle given the small
number of casualties it caused.82

This incident marked the beginning of numerous IS
follow-on chemical weapons attacks with primarily
chlorine and sulfur mustard agents utilized, although
some early use of pesticides is also noted. A Jane’s
report alleged that at least 52 incidents took place in
Syria and Iraq through mid-November 2016,83 and a
later report alleged 30 incidents took place in Syria,
and 41 incidents took place in Iraq through the end
of June 2017.84 The initial report identified 19 of the 52
alleged chemical attacks as having taken place in the
Mosul area, reflecting the centrality of that region as
the basis of much of the IS’s chemical weapons program.85 A well-crafted tactical and operational analysis of IS chemical weapons use identifies its utilization
for the harassment of enemy forces, defensive military operations (especially as a chemical IED mine to
cover retreats along roadways), and as terror weapons
used against civilian populations.86 A sampling of the
IS chemical weapons attacks have been identified in
table 5 and are discussed herein.
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DATE

LOCATION

AGENT;
DELIVERY
METHOD

TARGET; DEATHS
AND CASUALTIES
Kurdish fighters; 0
deaths and 25 casualties

October 21,
2014

Kobane, Syria

Unknown—sulfur
mustard, riot control, or phosphine

January 23,
2015

Highway
between Mosul
and Syrian
Border, Iraq

Chlorine; 1 VBIED Peshmerga fighters; 0
(or AVBIED)
deaths and 12 casualties

March 12,
2015

Tikrit area, Iraq

Chlorine; 1 roadside bomb

August 21
and
September 1,
2015

Marea, Syria

Sulfur mustard; <52 Militia and civilians;
artillery and Gvoz- 0 deaths and 113 cadika missiles (122 sualties
mm) and 18 artillery and Gvozdika
missiles (122 mm)

February 11
and 25, 2016

Dumise and
Sinjar, Iraq

Chlorine and sul- Militia and civilians;
fur mustard; 30 120 0 deaths and ~285 camm mortar shells/ sualties
chlorine; 19 rockets

March 9 and
12, 2016

Taza, Iraq

Sulfur mustard; <40 Militia and civilians;
rockets
1 death and ~600 casualties

April 5, 2016

Deir-e-Zor,
Syria

Sulfur
mustard;
Artillery or rocket
barrage

Assad regime airbase;
Unknown number of
casualties

April 15-16,
2017

Abar, Mosul,
Iraq

Chlorine; 2 rockets

Iraqi
soldiers;
0
deaths and 13 casualties

Iraqi Forces; 0 deaths
and 0 casualties

Table 5. Chemical Weapons Use in Iraq and Syria by
the Islamic State (IS)—Selected87
Kobane, Syria (October 21, 2014)
An IS “bomb” (likely a rocket or artillery shell)
detonated near a hospital in west Kobane during the
later evening hours and released a chemical agent.
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Approximately 25 Kurdish fighters and civilians
were affected by the chemical blast. The symptomatic
effects on those injured included “choking, breathing
difficulties, bleeding eyes, and burning skin” as well
as the development of large body blisters.88 This signature suggests that a sulfur mustard agent was likely
utilized, although this would represent an outlier of
such IS use patterns that were thought to not begin
until later in 2015. Chlorine would not produce such
physiological effects, although some potent types of
military riot control agents (such as chloroacetophenone [CN] or chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile [CS])
could potentially produce such outcomes, as do some
pesticides such as phosphine.
Highway Between Mosul and Syrian Border, Iraq (January
23, 2015)
An interdicted IS VBIED (or more likely an
armored VBIED [AVBIED]) attack on Peshmerga
fighters resulted in their being subjected to the effects
of chlorine in this incident:
The Kurdish statement said the car bombing attempt
happened on a highway between Mosul and the Syrian
border. A Kurdish security source said that the peshmerga
fired a rocket at the car carrying the bomb so there were
no casualties, except for the suicide bomber. . . . About
a dozen peshmerga fighters experienced symptoms of
nausea, vomiting, dizziness or weakness, the source
said.89

Tikrit Region, Iraq (March 12, 2015)
A video embedded in the incident source article
shows the detonation of a chlorine IED along the side
of a roadway in the Tikrit area. While the chlorine gas
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produced is not generally lethal, it can be incapacitating to Iraqi soldiers subjected to the effects of this
choking agent. It also produces a psychological effect
on troops subjected to these attacks. Dozens of these
roadside chlorine IEDs have been defused by Iraqi
bomb squad personnel in the offensive against the IS
in the Tikrit region since the end of February 2015.90
Marea, Syria (August 21 and September 1, 2015)
In two IS attacks on Marea, sulfur mustard was utilized in an undisclosed percentage of the 52 artillery
and Gvozdika missiles (122 mm) fired into the town
in the initial incident, and in the 18 artillery and Gvozdika missiles (122 mm) in the second incident. In the
first incident, 76 casualties resulted, and in the second
incident, 37 casualties took place, with individuals suffering from symptoms of toxic gas poisoning, including breathing issues, eye problems, and skin sores and
blisters. The chemical artillery fires against the town
were a prelude to the ongoing IS offensive in that area
of Aleppo province against Kurdish forces.91
Dumise and Sinjar, Iraq (February 11 and 25, 2016)
The IS launched 19 chlorine-carrying rockets from
about 5 km away into the community of Sinjar. Nearly
110 people—mostly Pershmerga fighters—suffered
headaches, nausea, and vomiting from the attack. The
region has been plagued with snipers, sporadic mortar
salvos, and chemical weapons attacks, with an IS
chemical incident taking place earlier in February. In
the attack focused on Dumise, near Sinjar, mortar fires
were utilized. Roughly 30 120 mm shells, some likely
loaded with chlorine and others with sulfur mustard,
were utilized, causing 175 casualties.92
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Taza, Iraq (March 9 and 12, 2016)
At least 40 surface-to-surface rockets, with an
undisclosed number carrying sulfur mustard agent,
were fired by the IS at the Shiite Turkmen town of
Taza over the course of 4 days of fighting. About 600
casualties were said to have resulted from the attacks,
with 8 people said to be in severe condition and 1
person killed.93
Deir-e-Zor, Syria (April 5, 2016)
A ground offensive against defensive positions in
villages outside the Assad regime airbase at Deir-eZor took place in coordination with either an artillery
or rocket barrage of sulfur mustard gas. The intent
of the chemical barrage was to pin down regime soldiers in the airbase so that they could not be used to
reinforce the defensive positions being attacked by IS
forces. The chemical attack had no apparent effect on
the outcome of the ground offensive. No information
was provided on Assad regime soldier casualties from
the sulfur mustard attack other than the fact that a
number of them suffered breathing problems.94
Abar, Mosul, Iraq (April 15 and 16, 2017)
An IS rocket with a chlorine payload landed on an
Iraqi troop position in the Abar area of Mosul, injuring seven soldiers. The next day, a similar attack took
place, also presumably utilizing chlorine, that injured
six more soldiers in the Mosul area. The attacks were
intended to slow down the advance of Iraqi troops
against the last IS stronghold still remaining in western Mosul. Gas masks were issued to Iraqi troops to
protect them from these types of attacks.95
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CONTEMPORARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
SYRIA AND IRAQ: ANALYSIS AND LESSONS
LEARNED
The two case studies of chemical weapons programs and use related to the Assad regime and the IS
provide quite a few valuable insights for U.S. Army
operational planning as well as higher-level ancillary strategic considerations. The following lessons
learned concern the Assad regime’s chemical weapons
program and their use of chemical warfare agents in
Syria.
• The Assad regime has and will continue to view
chemical weapons as a strategic resource. They
represent a weapon of mass destruction, albeit
a “poor man’s atomic bomb” equivalent, that
provides the regime with a deterrent to foreign
state incursions and a means to either hold or
acquire strategically valuable territory within
Syria for regime survival purposes. This has,
however, turned out to be a weak deterrent
to nuclear-armed states like the United States
and Israel that have conducted targeted strikes
inside Syria in the past. Chemical weapons use
has also been very judicious vis-à-vis the initial
and even later regime stockpiles of these agents.
The regime’s perspective on chemical weapons
is an evolved one, as opposed to the less sophisticated IS orientation to these munitions that is
more operationally and tactically focused. This
may be due to the decades-long association the
Assad (father and son) regimes have had with
chemical weapons and the fact that the Syrian
Arab Republic is an established autocratic
state, unlike the IS that was a relatively new
proto-state even at its height.
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• Assad regime survival is more important than
its chemical weapons program or engaging in
chemical warfare. Even though chemical weapons are of strategic value, they are still considered a bargaining chip if regime survival
is ultimately at stake. This is why much of the
chemical weapons program was traded away
post-Ghouta to ensure the Syrian civil war
was not further widened via increased foreign
military aid to rebel groups and Western coalition attacks on regime facilities and military
assets. The regime view was that only parts of
the chemical weapons program needed to be
declared to “politically” satisfy the CWC conditions placed upon it, and that the program could
be reconstituted at a later date. The regime survival imperative would also suggest that under
no circumstances would the regime authorize
attacks with chemical weapons anywhere near
where U.S. personnel were operating in Syria—
the immediate blowback potentials would
simply be too high.
• To protect the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program and its ability to use chemical
weapons, deception and outright lies have been
actively utilized by the regime on an ongoing
basis. Further, the regime’s Russian and Iranian
allies are also involved in the sustained effort to
promote fake news and propaganda narratives
that protect the regime and its chemical weapons program. In news broadcasts and social
media posts, incidents of regime use of chemical
weapons are said either not to have taken place
or blame is instead placed on rebel groups and
Western liberal democratic coalition members
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for carrying out the chemical weapons attacks.
This also means that the relationship of the
regime with the UN and their chemical weapons inspectors is one in which only the chemical production facilities, storage facilities, and
delivery systems the regime is willing to bargain away have been shown to the UN inspectors. Moreover, when chemical weapons use
incidents do take place, the UN inspectors are
only shown sites or provided with information
the regime wants them to have.
• The Assad regime continues to engage in brinkmanship when utilizing chemical warfare
attacks on its enemies within Syria. The Syrian
Arab Republic’s intent has been to gain as
much military advantage by their use of chemical weapons up to the point that international
opinion begins fully to turn against the regime
or the regime is immediately threated by attacks
by the United States, France, Israel, and other
Western coalition states. This pattern of brinkmanship can first be seen with the initial pattern
of sarin attacks in 2013, leading up to the Ghouta
incident that resulted in being a miscalculation
on the part of the Assad regime. The next phase
of chemical agent use, beginning in April 2014,
was more discreet and subtle, utilizing chlorine
while the regime cooperated with the CWC in
the destruction of its declared chemical weapons program. This was followed by the regime
testing the new U.S. administration (as it had
done with the former one) in what was likely
to become a new round of sarin gas attacks in
April 2017 that was met with an immediate U.S.
cruise missile response.
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• Some chemical weapons are more favored than
others for battlefield use by the Assad regime.
Reports of chemical weapons use by the regime
are clustered around sarin (a nerve agent)
and chlorine (a choking agent). For whatever
reason, sulfur mustard has not been utilized by
the Assad regime in any identifiable quantities
that have been picked up by the world’s news
or social media. Up to 180 metric tons of this
chemical agent may potentially exist in regime
stockpiles. The identified use of VX has also not
taken place. The regime may still have some
stockpiles of this agent left; however, this is a
speculative assumption. VX is far more toxic
than sarin, so it is unknown if this agent is being
held as a reserve for its deterrence value—possibly against Israel—or if it is considered a chemical weapon of last resort in case the regime has
to make a last stand in defense of its controlled
areas in Damascus. One reason sulfur mustard
may not have been utilized is that the regime
can get away with using the less-toxic chemical chlorine with some impunity but not sulfur
mustard and sarin. However, sarin is far more
effective than sulfur mustard and is the lethal
chemical weapon of choice when the regime
needs to clear or hold key sections of cities.
Lessons learned concerning the IS’s chemical
weapons program and their use of chemical warfare
agents in Iraq and Syria include:
• The IS approached chemical weapons use with
an operationally and tactically focused thought
process. Due to the low lethality of the chemical
agents produced and the limited range of their
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delivery systems, the IS perspective on chemical weapons has never advanced beyond the
operational level. These weapons are viewed on
par with other tools of war and, as such, hold
no strategic value for deterrence purposes. Further, international laws and norms outlawing
the use of these agents, such as the CWC and
earlier arms control treaties, are meaningless to
an entity that is anathema to the Westphalian
order in the Middle East. Given the IS’s ongoing
propensity to advocate active shooter, bombing,
and vehicular overrun attacks in Europe and
North America, these weapons are also highly
valued for the “strategic terrorism” potentials
that they may offer when utilized against civilian targets in the West. Such threatened chemical
weapons attacks in the West, however, have not
as yet materialized or even been interdicted.96
• The IS weaponized chemical agents as it could
and utilized them as soon as feasible. The
chemical weapons program developed by the
IS (like its other specialized weapons producing unmanned aerial systems [UAS], rockets
and mortars, and AVBIEDs) engaged in justin-time production of its munitions. Unlike a
state, which is based on an industrial model of
production with large stockpiles of armaments
accumulated (as was evident in the Assad
regime chemical weapons program), the IS
engaged in do-it-yourself and cottage industry
type manufacturing, with small-scale production taking place. During its entire existence, the
IS has been on a perpetual war footing with its
armaments either immediately sent to the front
lines or stockpiled for near-term offensive and
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defensive operations. An additional reason for
their not engaging in the stockpiling of large
caches of chemical weapons is that such storage
facilities would become ideal targets for U.S.
and coalition air and missile strikes.
• The chemical weapons sophistication achieved
by the IS never matured past a moderate level
of chemistry, with a weaker form of sulfur mustard being the deadliest agent produced. The terrorist organization appears to have begun with
pesticide and chlorine agent use in mid-2014,
and then in 2015 included sulfur mustard, albeit
a weak powdered form, in its chemical weapons arsenal. No evidence of nerve agent lab synthesis or production exists for this group. This
is likely due to the fact that the IS either: a) has
been unable to repurpose and weaponize nerve
agents said to have been acquired from Assad
regime stockpiles in Syria and older Saddam
regime stockpiles in Iraq; b) had these interdicted prior to such use with this information
not released to the public, which represents a
very low probability event; or c) did not acquire
usable weaponized munitions, chemical agents,
or precursors from these stockpiles in the first
place.
• The development of the IS chemical weapons
program was hindered by ongoing U.S. and
coalition subject matter experts and facilities
targeting operations. The counter-IS chemical
weapons program effort began with the recapture of the former Saddam-era Al Muthanna
chemical weapons facility in late November
2014. This event was then followed by the elimination of Abu Malik, a chemical warfare expert,
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in January 2015. IS chemical weapons expert
Sleiman Daoud al-Afari was then hunted down
and captured in February 2016, with his subsequent debriefing providing targeting information that allowed for strikes on an IS chemical
production facility and a tactical unit to be conducted. In May 2016, a senior IS chemical expert
was then targeted and killed, with follow-on
air strikes taking place on multiple IS chemical
weapons and production facilities in September
2016. Key IS chemical weapons research and
production sites were then overrun in the Mosul
area in early 2017, with some of the remaining IS
chemical weapons experts being placed on targeting lists in June 2017. From July through September 2017, ongoing air and artillery strikes on
some of the remaining IS chemical production
and storage facilities persisted.
• The chemical weapons program never developed to the point that it supported combined
arms operations or was integrated with the
IS UAS or AVBIED programs. A review of IS
chemical warfare incidents supported by earlier IS operational use analysis,97 as well as a
familiarity with IS UAS and AVBIED utilization, suggest that the program did not mature
beyond its experimental stage of development
to the tactical, technical, and procedural stage
or from a larger operational perspective.98 No
examples of IS fighters (not even inghimasi or
martyrdom-oriented ones) engaging in immediate follow-on attacks into chemical weapons use
zones were identified. Rather, chemical weapons use appeared to be more of a stand-alone
activity, although an attempt to synchronize
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this use with the attack on the Assad regime
Deir-e-Zor air base was noted, as was using
roadside chlorine IEDs to cover withdrawing IS
forces. Also of interest is the fact that, later in
the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, UAS intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; command
and control; and propaganda videotaping functions were integrated in support of IS AVBIED
attacks. While some UAS intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and artillery spotting
of chemical weapons barrages has taken place,
the integration of more developed UAS and
AVBIED activities with chemical warfare operations is absent.99
U.S. Army Policy and Planning Considerations
The Assad regime and IS chemical weapons programs and selected use incidents highlighted in this
monograph offered a number of lessons learned. In
turn, these lessons learned and the underlying chemical weapons program and incident information they
are derived from provide insights that can aid in the
development of U.S. Army policy guidance related to
operating in environments contaminated by chemical weapons and ancillary mitigation, deterrence, and
elimination (i.e., arms control) issues.
It should be noted, however, that the policy and
planning considerations provided here have been
decoupled from present Department of Defense countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) programs and policies.100 The reason for this variance is
that the present CWMD approach is primarily focused
on homeland security, public health, and disaster
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relief and only broadly addresses chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear event incidents.101 Further,
concern exists that the present CWMD orientation
ignores the reality that the U.S. Army may someday
be forced to operate in threatened or actual environments contaminated by chemical weapons:
There is no question that since the Cold War began,
every presidential administration has viewed WMD as
a top national security threat. However, the operational
community does not view WMD as an immediate
concern, leaving details such as military strategies and
doctrine to a largely technically and tactically focused
DoD counter-WMD community. This has traditionally
resulted in segregated policies and specialized issues
rather than integrating WMD concerns into mainstream
concepts and preparing the general force to address
WMD within conventional and irregular operations. The
updated strategy follows that pattern, offering a nationallevel discussion on countering WMD that fails to provide
the services a meaningful directive to improve their
ability to meet stated policy objectives.102

An additional concern related to this approach is
that it results in the defunding of U.S. Army CWMD
programs and the ensuing force reductions this
entails.103 Further, U.S. Special Operations Command, since early 2017, has been placed in the lead for
CWMD efforts.104 While this may offer some new
advantages, it will not necessarily enhance the needs
of strategic Landpower projection in environments
contaminated by chemical weapons. Given these concerns, the U.S. Army counter-chemical warfare policy
and planning guidance proposed herein, decoupled
from the present CWMD approach, is as follows.105
• Support joint and interagency intelligence collection and analysis of the state or nonstate
chemical warfare program of concern. Open
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source, restricted, and classified intelligence on
a chemical warfare program, and the chemical
weapons use patterns of a threat entity, can be
aggregated, fused, and analyzed at the appropriate clearance level. This should be an ongoing activity that draws upon U.S. Government
information databases and reports, academic
literature, traditional news, and social media,
as well as more specialized private intelligence
subscription services. State and nonstate chemical warfare programs will be organizationally
different in nature and, as a result, will require
different forms of analytics to be applied against
them, including order of battle (line and block),
systems, and network analysis.106
• Recognize the context within which the state or
nonstate chemical warfare program exists. As
was seen with the Assad regime and the IS, they
each approached their chemical weapons program and use in very different ways. In addition to engaging in intelligence collection and
analysis of a chemical warfare program, the military and political context of the program must
be determined vis-à-vis the state or nonstate
entity to which it belongs. Understanding a program’s context and its relationship to other military programs allows for more appropriate and
focused strategies to be developed to counter it.
• Support the Joint Force in implementing
National Command Authority (NCA) guidance
concerning preconflict removal and elimination
of the state or nonstate chemical warfare program. The Assad regime accedence to the CWC
and subsequent elimination of its declared
chemical weapons program components signifies that imposing international arms control
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agreements on rogue states, even if it is done
so under the threat of direct attack, does in fact
have some utility. While the international agreement with the Assad regime was far from optimal, it portrays the fact that proactive chemical
weapons removal, even if only partial in nature,
is far more preferable than allowing chemical
weapons programs to remain intact, given the
battlefield threat that more lethal nerve agents
represent to U.S. Landpower forces. Further, as
in the case of Libya, denying the IS access to the
last remaining Gaddafi-era chemical weapons
stockpile in Ruwagha has to be lauded as a proactive policy.
• Be prepared to support the Joint Force to implement NCA guidance related to deterrence
and chemical warfare use response protocols.
Depending on the size and sophistication of
the chemical warfare program of concern, preconflict provisions may be actively required
to deter the use of chemical weapons against
in-theater U.S. Army and Joint Forces. As an
example, given both the nature of the IS and its
marginal level of development, chemical weapons use deterrence simply does not work. Additionally, no proportional or escalatory response
to such a marginal chemical weapons attack
would even be considered. When faced with the
threat of a full-scale North Korean sarin artillery barrage on Seoul, however, the threat of a
tactical nuclear response would likely be warranted for both deterrence and actual response
requirements. Any such nuclear deterrence and
response protocols would, by necessity, require
U.S. Army forces to engage in higher-level
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planning subordinated to Joint Force and NCA
structures.
• Support the Joint Force to implement NCA
guidance concerning preemptive strike options
against the state or nonstate chemical warfare
program. As part of the predeployment planning process, preemptive conventional strike
considerations are required to be addressed.
This is also not an Army-specific consideration;
rather, the Army must once again work within
the Joint Force and NCA structure with such an
action possibly resulting in a retaliatory chemical weapons use strike against out-of-theater
Army, joint, or allied forces. Even with actionable indications and warnings of a threat entity
(specifically, a state) preparing to engage in a
preemptive chemical weapons strike of its own
against U.S. or allied forces, no proportional or
escalatory (e.g., tactical nuclear) preemption
of such a strike should be undertaken. To do
so would undermine the U.S. strategic narrative, our underlying liberal democratic values,
and be in variance with international laws and
norms of behavior.
• Train, equip, and organize the force for operations in the projected environment contaminated by chemical weapons that may emerge.
This recommendation falls under the purview
of preexisting Army schools and forces, including the chemical training component of the
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Defense School at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and
the 48th Chemical Brigade headquartered at
Fort Hood, TX. It is essentially an existing standard operating procedure. However, the type
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of predeployment training and equipping of the
force required for the projected environment
contaminated by chemical weapons will benefit
from the initial analysis of the chemical warfare
program of concern; the chemical weapons use
patterns; and the contextual relationship of the
program to the state or nonstate entity within
which it exists. Hence, the present chemical warfare threat potentials of North Korea are vastly
different and far more severe than Iranian, or
for that matter, even Assad regime legacy and
reconstituted capabilities. Predeployment training and equipping for force projection purposes
simply has to reflect the reality that chemical weapons defense is not a “one size fits all”
proposition.
• Extend chemical warfare defense planning to
rear area basing, coalition force, and civilian
populations in the areas of responsibility of
the Army Landpower force. Rear area strikes
on Army forces and coalition forces attacked
with chemical weapons scenarios are required
to be considered in Landpower deployments,
with force and allied force protection planning
required for such contingencies. As an example
of such coalition force chemical warfare defense
needs, the U.S. military distributed 40,000 gas
masks to Iraqi Security Forces brigades, 1,500
gas masks to the Iraqi Counter Terror Service,
and 9,000 gas masks to Kurdish Peshmerga
fighters operating against IS forces.107 Under
principles of international humanitarian law,
the Army also has a duty to protect civilian
populations. Such protection thus needs to be
extended to include chemical weapons defense
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planning for such vulnerable populations existing in Army areas of responsibility.
• Prepare for the trans-conflict targeting of the
state or nonstate chemical warfare program.
This recommendation is conceptually linked to
the earlier “support the Joint Force to implement
NCA guidance concerning preemptive strike
options” recommendation taking place during
the pre- to early-entry of ground forces phases;
however, in this instance, it is taking place after
ground forces have been deployed to the theater of operations. The highly successful U.S.
Central Command strategy of targeting the IS
chemical warfare program, its leadership, infrastructure, and weaponized agents represents an
example of this form of targeting. This counterchemical weapons strategy not only kept the
IS program from developing past its nascent
stages, but degraded it by early to mid-2017 to
the point that this threat group now has little to
no capacity to create or field chemical weapons.
• Develop a strategic counter-narrative plan
against the expected propaganda campaign that
will be utilized by the state or nonstate entity
possessing the chemical warfare program. This
proposed area of guidance very much represents
an unforeseen, yet important, requirement for
Army counter-chemical weapons planning. The
Assad regime chemical weapons program and
use case study signifies that active propaganda
campaigns may emerge to both protect the
chemical weapons program of concern and to
create confusion concerning incidents of chemical weapons use, by either stating such use did
not take place, that the target of the attack was
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the actual perpetrator, or that a third party such
as a U.S. ally or even the United States itself was
responsible for the chemical attack. The Assad
regime, in coordination with their Russian and
Iranian allies, has elevated such active propaganda, with the inclusion of fake news reports
and social media posts, to such an effective level,
at least at times, that the U.S. Army must now
initiate strategic counter-narrative planning as
a supportive component to chemical warfare
defense considerations.
Additional considerations in support of the above
policy and planning guidance focus on a number of
elements. First, red teaming and wargaming should
be utilized in support of the guidance discussed earlier. Such analytic techniques offer a cost-effective and
proven method of validating the counter-chemical
warfare policies and plans to be formulated. Second,
leadership development in the area of counterchemical weapons expertise beyond the operational
level should be fostered. Chemical weapons have
strategic impact potentials, especially when ballistic missiles with nerve agent payloads are pointed at
U.S. allies. Finally, research and writing pertaining
to Army chemical weapons defense policy should be
encouraged at the War College level. This area of concern is very much an understudied field at the strategic Landpower studies level with little to no work
being carried out on this subject matter.108 Given the
very real 21st-century threat that the potential use of
chemical weapons represents, more professional consideration by Army strategic leaders will be required
to address it properly.
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